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TREATMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
VIOLATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 
JOHAN D. VAN DER VYVER † 
In our day and age, the violation of human rights has become a matter of 
international concern. This article is focused on the sharing of those concerns by 
the United States, in particular as manifested by the treatment of human rights 
violations in the United States. Following introductory observations in Part I 
highlighting the special commitment of the United States to the protection of 
international human rights, the article will show, in Part II thereof, that in virtue 
of Article 6, Clause [2] of the American Constitution (the Supremacy Clause), 
human rights conventions are in principle self-executing in the United States.1 
However, the United States invariably adds a reservation to its instruments of 
ratification of such conventions proclaiming that they will not be self-executing 
in the United States. Incorporating the provisions of human rights conventions 
ratified by the United States into the country’s municipal legal system therefore 
requires Congressional implementation legislation, which will be exemplified in 
Part III with reference to the Torture Convention Implementation Act of 1994. 
Part IV of the article is devoted to the exercise of universal jurisdiction by federal 
courts, in virtue of Article 1, Section (8), Clause [10] of the Constitution, to bring 
to justice those responsible for piracies and felonies on the High Seas and 
offences against the law of nations.2 In the United States, universal jurisdiction of 
federal courts is not confined to criminal prosecutions but has also been extended 
by the Alien Tort Statute to civil actions by foreign victims of a tort that 
constitutes a violation of the law of nations or of a treaty entered into by the 
United States.3 The treatment of human rights violations under the Alien Tort 
Statute and similar legislation is the subject-matter of Part V of this article. Some 
concluding observations to evaluate the above manifestations of the American 
commitment to human rights, notably in view of considerations based on the 
national interests of the United States and a perception of American 
exceptionalism, will bring the article to a close in Part VI thereof. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On the international front, the United States may be singled out for its 
leading role in the establishment of the United Nations Organization and in the 
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 1.  U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2. 
 2.  U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
 3.  Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C.A., § 1350 (2004). 
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drafting of international instruments for the protection of human rights. During 
its infancy, the United Nations established the Human Rights Commission to, 
among other things, draft a human rights charter that will specify the meaning to 
be attributed in international law to the concepts of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. In 1948, the Commission produced the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).4 The Commission was chaired at the time 
by Eleanor Roosevelt, widow of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882-1945) 
of the United States. In large part thanks to the efforts of Eleanor Roosevelt, the 
UDHR was not confined to civil and political rights but also included an 
impressive list of economic and social rights.5 Such rights mimicked the 
“freedom from want” component of her late husband’s State of the Nation 
Address to Congress of 1941, commonly referred to as his “Four Freedoms” 
speech,6 as elaborated in the President’s State of the Nation message of 1944.7 The 
rather uncommon phrase used by the President to denote economic and social 
rights—”freedom from want”—is actually used in the Preamble to the UDHR, 
alongside freedom of speech and belief, and freedom from fear, as having been 
proclaimed “as the highest aspiration of the common people.”8 The UDHR was 
adopted on December 10, 1948, with forty-eight of the then fifty-six Member 
States of the United Nations voting in favour of its adoption and with eight 
abstentions.9 
When the Obama administration on April 24, 2009 informed the President 
of the General Assembly of the United Nations of the United States’ candidacy 
for a seat in the Human Rights Council, it added an Annex to its letter outlining 
The Human Rights Commitments and Pledges of the United States. The Annex 
recorded a promise of the executive branch to work with the legislative branch 
“to consider the possible ratification of human rights treaties, including but not 
limited to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
 
 4.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(III)A, U.N. GAOR, 3d.Sess., at 71 
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) (hereafter “UDHR”).  Calling the UDHR the Universal (instead of the 
International) Declaration of Human Rights represents a contribution of the French Council Member 
and Nobel Prize laureate, René Cassin (1887-1976). 
 5.  Id., arts. 21–28. 
 6.  See 87 CONG. REC. H46 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1941) (statement of President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt). (Translating “[F]reedom from want” into “world terms, mean[ing] economic 
understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peace-time life for its inhabitants 
everywhere in the world”). 
 7.  See 90 CONG. REC. H57 (daily ed. Jan. 11, 1944) (statement of President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt). Freedom from want denotes that “true individual freedom cannot exist without economic 
security and independence,” and the rights that clearly belong to this forgotten category, the 
President proclaimed, include the right to a useful and remunerative job; the right to earn enough to 
provide adequate food, clothing, and recreation; the right of every farmer to raise and sell his 
products; the right of every businessman to trade in an atmosphere of freedom from unfair 
competition and domination by monopolies; the right of every family to a decent home; the right to 
adequate medical care; the right to protection from economic fears of old age, sickness, accident, and 
unemployment; and the right to a good education. Id. 
 8.  UDHR, supra note 4, Preamble. 
 9.  The States that abstained were Saudi Arabia, South Africa, the Soviet Union, four Eastern 
European States and a Soviet republic whose votes were controlled by the Soviet Union. Commission 
on Human Rights 3rd Session, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2008), available at 
http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/udhr/docs_1948_3rd_chr.shtml#docList.  
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Women.”10 
The commitment of the United States on the international front to promote 
the observance of human rights had a sound base within the confines of its 
national laws and practices. The United States can rightly take pride in having 
initiated, way back in 1789, a system for the protection of human rights 
principles through the medium of a constitutional bill of rights. Its ground-
breaking initiative acquired practical relevance when the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Marbury v. Madison confirmed the competence of courts of law to test, and if need 
be to invalidate, legislative acts found to be inconsistent with the pertinent 
constitutional provisions.11 Within the confines of its constitutional directives, the 
United States throughout its history has responded quite admirably to 
international law violations, particularly those that involve transgressions of 
human rights directives as perceived by and in the United States. America’s 
ability to respond to violations of international law has been facilitated by several 
basic norms of the American legal system, including (a) incorporation of 
international law into the municipal legal system of the United States through 
implementation legislation, (b) affording American courts universal jurisdiction 
to adjudicate violations of the law of nations (customary international law),12 and 
(c) entrusting federal courts with the power to entertain civil actions for damages 
based on transgressions of a sub-set of customary international law or of a treaty 
entered into by the United States.13 
In virtue of the Supremacy Clause in the Constitution, international treaties, 
including human rights covenants and conventions ratified by the United States, 
are as a general rule self-executing in the United States,14 and accordingly, the 
United States can in principle take action in its municipal courts against those 
who violate such covenants and convention. In cases where an international 
treaty is self-executing in the United States and the treaty provisions are 
contradicted by American law, according to the Restatement (Third) of the 
Foreign Relations Law, the following rules apply: (i) The Constitution is the 
ultimate supreme law of the land: in the event of a conflict between a self-
executing treaty provision and the Constitution, the constitutional provision 
must be upheld;15 (ii) A self-executing treaty is equal in status with federal law: 
in the event of a conflict between a treaty provision and a federal statute, the one 
later in date will prevail;16 and (iii) A self-executing treaty is superior to state law: 
 
 10.  U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITMENTS AND PLEDGES (Apr. 16, 2009), 
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/121976.pdf. 
 11.  See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 12.  U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2. 
 13.  Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
 14.  See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (proclaiming that “all Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land” [emphasis added]). 
 15.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 115(3), 
302(2), 721; see also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1957) (“It would be manifestly contrary to the 
objectives of those who created the Constitution . . . to construe Article VI as permitting the United 
States to exercise power under an international agreement without observing constitutional 
prohibitions.”). 
 16. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115(2); 
United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 118–19 (1933); 
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in the event of a conflict between a treaty provision and a state law, the treaty 
provision will remain in force irrespective of the date on which that state law 
was enacted (before or after the treaty provision became binding on the United 
States).17 
The United States is probably the only country in the world where universal 
jurisdiction of national courts of law to bring the perpetrators of international 
crimes to justice is authorized by the country’s constitution.18 According to Jordan 
Paust, universal jurisdiction has been recognized in the United States “since the 
dawn of . . . [its] history,”19 and it has been recognized or applied in cases 
involving, among other things, acts of terrorism,20 crimes against humanity,21 
and aircraft piracy and hostage taking.22 
The United States is probably also the only country in the world that 
afforded to its municipal courts of law universal jurisdiction in a civil action for 
damages. Under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATS), included in the Judiciary Act 
of 1789, federal courts have been granted “original jurisdiction of any civil 
actions by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations 
[customary international law] or a treaty of the United States.”23 Likewise, the 
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1992 explicitly affords an action for damages to 
victims of torture (including American nationals) suffered at the hands of any 
person acting under actual or apparent authority, or colour of law, of any foreign 
nation.24 In Kadić v. Karadžić, the Court held that rape, torture and summary 
executions committed by an individual as part of genocide are actionable as 
“violations of the law of nations” under the ATS Act (and therefore as a crime 
under customary international law) “without regard to state action.”25 The Court 
also stated that the liability of private persons for war crimes, having been 
recognized since World War I and confirmed by the Nuremberg trials after 
 
Fong Yue Tung v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 720 (1893); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194–95 
(1888); United Shoe Mach. Co. v. Duplessis Shoe Mach. Co., 155 F. 842, 845–46 (1st Cir. 1907); General 
Electric Co. v. Robertson, 21 F. 2d 214, 215–16 (D. Md. 1927); JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 101-07, 118-19 (2nd ed., 2003);Yuji Iwasawa, The Doctrine of Self-
Executing Treaties in the United States: A Critical Analysis, 26 VA. J. INT’L L. 627, at 688. 
 17.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE Foreign RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111(1); 
Nielson v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 52 (1929); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230–31 (1942); Iwasawa, 
supra note 16, at 688. 
 18.  U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 10 (affording to Congress the power “To define and punish 
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations”); and see 
Johan D. van der Vyver, Prosecuting Offences against the Law of Nations in the United States, 20 EMORY 
INT’L L. REV. 77-110 (2007). 
 19.  Jordan J. Paust, Federal Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Acts of Terrorism, Non-Immunity for 
Foreign Violations of International Law under the FSIA and the Acts of State Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT’L L 191, 
211 (1983). 
 20.  Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 885 (5th Cir. 1967); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 
726 F.2d 774, 775, 781 (D.C. Cir.1984). 
 21.  Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 581-83 (6th Cir. 1985). 
 22.  United States v. Yunis, 681 F.Supp. 896, 900-01 (D.D.C. 1988). 
 23.  28 U.S.C., § 1350 (2006).  
 24.  Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 STAT. 73 (1992), codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 1350. The Act also affords an action for damages based on extra-judicial killings. 
 25.  Kadić v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, at 244 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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World War II, has become “an important aspect of international law.”26 
This Article will concentrate on provisions in the Constitution that render 
international human rights treaties self-executing in the United States; 
implementation by the American legislature of international human rights 
treaties; and the exercise of universal jurisdiction of the country’s federal court as 
a means of dealing internally with international human rights violations. This 
Article will show that in the United States responses to international human 
rights violations can in principle be based on three modalities of the American 
legal system, namely: 
(a) The enforcement of self-executing provisions of international human rights 
covenants and conventions that have been ratified by the United States; 
(b) The incorporation of international norms for the protection of human rights 
into the municipal legal system of the United States by implementation 
legislation; and 
(c) The exercise of universal jurisdiction by federal courts to bring perpetrators of 
international human rights violations to justice. 
These modalities are indeed not confined to the American legal system, but 
their implementation is in many respects determined by different law-
enforcement rules and political strategies that prevail in different countries. A 
comparative analysis of their governance will exceed the focus on this article, 
which is confined to the treatment of international human rights violations in the 
United States only. 
II. Self-executing Norms of International Human Rights 
The Supremacy Clause in the Constitution of the United States, which 
provides in part that “all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land,”27 in 
principle renders international treaties for supremacy purposes self-executing in 
the United States;28 that is to say, the treaty provisions automatically become part 
of American law and their incorporation into the American legal system does not 
require implementation legislation.29 
There are, however, several exceptions to this rule. According to the 
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, an international 
agreement entered into by the United States will not be self-executing: 
(i) If the agreement manifests an intention that it shall not become effective as 
 
 26.  Id. at 243; and see also Jordan J. Paust, Suing Karadžić, 10 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 91, at 97 (1997) 
(noting that private individuals are liable for violations of international law, “especially with respect 
to genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity”). 
 27.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 28.  Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).; and see Jordan J. Paust, Medellín, Avena, the 
Supremacy of Treaties, and Relevant Executive Authority, 31 SUFFORLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 301, 315–20 
(2008). 
 29.  In countries based on the so-called dualistic system, such as Great Britain, treaties are not 
self-executing and their substance can only become part on the municipal law of the country through 
implementation legislation enacted by the national legislature. 
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domestic law without the enactment of implementing legislation; 
(ii) If the Senate in giving consent to a treaty, or Congress by resolution, requires 
implementation legislation; 
(iii) If implementation legislation is constitutionally required.30 
It has accordingly been decided that if a treaty ratified by the United States 
deals with a subject matter listed in the Constitution as falling exclusively within 
the powers of Congress,31 a treaty that overlap with those powers shall not be 
self-executing, and implementation legislation is then constitutionally required.32 
The reason for this position is obvious: If the Constitution affords to Congress the 
exclusive power to legislate on x, y and z, the Executive (with consent of the 
Senate) cannot usurp that power by incorporating rules of law pertinent to x, y or 
z into the municipal law of the United States. In such cases, implementation 
legislation enacted by Congress is constitutionally required. In spite of earlier 
opinions to the contrary,33 it has also been held that crime-creating treaties are 
not self-executing. As succinctly stated by way of obiter dictum in one of the 
earliest judgment, “It is not the function of treaties to enact the fiscal or criminal 
law of a nation. For this purpose no treaty is self-executing.”34 
The United States has in recent years — somewhat belatedly — ratified a 
number of international human rights treaties: the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948)35 in 1986;36 the Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (1966)37 in 1992;38 the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
 
 30.  Restatement (Third), supra note 15, at § 111(4); and see People of Saipen v. United States Dept. 
of Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 97 (9th Cir., 1974) (mentioning, from a different perspective, the following 
elements to be considered: “The purpose of the treaty and the objectives of its creators, the existence 
of domestic procedures and institutions appropriate for direct implementation, the availability and 
feasibility of alternative enforcement methods, and the immediate and long-term social consequences 
of self- or non-self-execution”). 
 31.  U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8. 
 32.  Edwards v. Carter, 580 F. 2d 1055, 1058 (D.C. Cir., 1922); JORDAN J. PAUST, JON. M. VAN DYKE 
& LINDA A. MALONE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE U.S., 136–49 (3rd ed., 2007); Yuji 
Iwasawa, supra note 16, at 675–76. 
 33.  See, for example, Morris v. United States, 161 F. 672, 675 (8th Cir., 1908) (stating that “[t]here 
are no crimes or offences cognizable in the federal courts, outside of maritime or international law or 
treaties, except such as are created and defined by acts of Congress”(emphasis added)). In Talbot v. 
Janson it was said: “That prima facie all pirates and trespasses committed against the general law of 
nations, are inquirable, and may be proceeded against in any nation where no special exemption can 
be maintained, either by the general law of nations, or by some treaty which forbids or restrains it.”2 
U.S. 133, 159–60 (1795). Reference here to “some treaty” refers to the exemption and not to the general 
rule of universal jurisdiction subscribed to in this citation. 
 34.  The Over the Top, Schroeder v. Bissell, 5 F.2d 838, 845 (D. Conn. 1925); see also Quincy 
Wright, Treaties and the Constitutional Separation of Powers in the United States, 12 AM. J. INT’L L. 64, 83–
84 (1918) (stating that treaties defining crimes or extending criminal jurisdiction require 
implementing legislation).  
 35.  Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 
Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951). 
 36.  CONG. REC. S1355-01 (daily ed., Feb. 19, 1986). 
 37.  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 
(1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967) (hereafter “ICCPR”). 
 38.  138 CONG. REC. S8070 (daily ed., Apr. 2, 1992). 
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Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984)39 in 1994;40 the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965)41 in 1994,42 and most 
recently the two Protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (2000)43 in 
2002.44 Those Protocols deal with involvement of children in armed conflict and 
the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography. 
International human rights covenants and conventions other than crime-
creating treaties do not fall within the confines of any of the exceptions that 
would render them non-self-executing in the United States. However, it is 
standard practice of the United States to add to its ratification instruments of 
such covenants and conventions a reservation proclaiming that they will not be 
self-executing in the United States.45 In the 1950’s, Senator Bricker of Ohio 
proposed an amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would have rendered all 
international treaties non-self-executing in the United States and that would even 
have prevented congressional legislation from implementing human rights 
treaties. The Bricker Amendment was defeated, but, according to Louis Henkin, 
its ghost lingered on and was resurrected by the package of Reservations, 
Understandings and Declarations (RUDs) which left “the Covenant [on Civil and 
Political Rights] without any life in the United States.”46 
 
 39.  Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984). 
 40.  36 CONG. REC. S17486 (daily ed., Oct. 27, 1990). 
 41.  International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, S. Exec. 
Doc. C., 95-2 (1966), 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969). 
 42.  140 CONG. REC. S7634 (daily ed., June 24, 1994). 
 43.  Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, 
Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, G.A. Res. A/RES/54/263 of 25 May 2000 (entered into 
force on Jan. 1, 2002); Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, G.A. Res. A/RES/54/263 of 25 May 2000 (entered into 
force on Feb. 2, 2002). 
 44.  Convention on Rights of the Child on Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict ─ Treaty 
Document No. 106-37A, 148 CONG REC. 10683 (2002); Convention on Rights of the Child on the Sale of 
Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography ─ Treaty Document No. 106-37B, 148 CONG REC. 
10683-85 (2002). The Instrument of ratification was deposited with the Secretar-General of the United 
Nations on December 23, 2002. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (Dec. 
23, 2002), available at http://2110-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/16198.htm.  
 45.  Louis Henkin summarized as follows the “principles” upon which the U.S. Senate insists 
when it comes to the ratification of international human rights instruments: 
1. The United States will not undertake any treaty obligation that it will not be able to carry out 
because it is inconsistent with the United States Constitution. 
2. United States adherence to an international human rights treaty should not effect — or promise — 
change in existing U.S. law or practice. 
3. The United States will not submit to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice to decide 
disputes as to the interpretation or application of human rights conventions. 
4. Every human right’s treaty to which the United States adheres should be subject to a “federalism 
clause” so that the United States could leave implementation of the convention largely to the states. 
5. Every international human rights agreement should be “non-self-executing.”  
Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 341, 341 (1995). 
 46.  Id., at 349. As to the substance of the RUD’s included in the American instruments of 
ratification of human rights conventions and covenants, see JOHAN D. VAN DER VYVER, 
IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, 82–86 (2010); see also M. Christian 
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The ratification policy of the United States also excludes the binding force of 
international human rights provisions that are in conflict with the Constitution, 
or deviate from existing laws and practices in the United States.47 In this regard it 
might be noted that the American system of human rights protection deviates in 
two important respects from prevailing international standards.  The federal Bill 
of Rights, firstly, only protects civil and political rights, to the exclusion of 
natural rights of the individual (such as the right to life and to human dignity), 
economic, social and cultural rights (such as the right to housing, education and 
health-care services), and solidarity rights (such as the right to development and 
to a healthy and clean environment).48 The protection of those rights is within the 
jurisdiction of states.49 Secondly, while international law proclaims inherent 
human dignity, alongside the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the 
human family, to be “the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world,”50 the American constitutional system has elevated the First Amendment 
Freedoms, and notably freedom of speech, to becoming the basic norm (die 
Grundnorm) of the entire system of constitutional protections.51 
Given the ratification policy of the United States, one, therefore, cannot rely 
on the Supremacy Clause and the principle rendering international human rights 
treaties self-executing in the United States for bringing the American system of 
law in conformity with international standards of human rights protection or for 
the treatment in the United States of international human rights violations. The 
international standards proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
that are not upheld by the United States include the proscription of “cruel, 
inhuman or degrading punishments,”52 the principle of equal protection of the 
laws,53 and the protection of economic, social and cultural rights.54 The United 
 
Green, The “Matroishka” Strategy: US Evasion of the Spirit of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, 10 SOU. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 357–71 (1994). 
 47.  See Henkin, supra note 45. 
 48.  As to the classification of human rights into “generations of rights”, see Johan D. van der 
Vyver, The Binding Force of Economic and Social Rights Listed in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, 30 HAMLINE J. PUBL. L. & POL’Y 125 (2008). 
 49.  By contrast, the South African Constitution, 1996 places on the national state the obligation 
to ”respect, protect, promote and fulfill the rights in the Bill of Rights” (SA Const., sec. 7(2)), and the 
rights listed in Chapter II of the Constitution include a rich variety of natural, civil and political, 
economic, social and cultural, and solidarity rights (SA Const., secs. 7-39). 
 50.  UDHR, supra note 4, Preamble; ICCPR, supra note 37, Preamble; International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Preamble, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into 
force Jan. 3, 1976). 
 51.  In American jurisprudence, the basic norm is commonly referred to as “preferred 
freedoms”, which denote “a scale of constitutional values.” United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263 
(1967). The American notion of “preferred freedoms” is commonly attributed to the footnote remark 
of Stone, J. in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 note 4 (1937). See W. FRIEDMANN, 
LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE 17–18 (class notes, Columbia University, 1971).  In Palko v. Connecticut, 
Cardozo, J. referred to freedom of thought and speech as “the matrix, the indispensable condition, of 
nearly every other form of freedom.” Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326–27 (1937). In Schneider v. 
State, Roberts, J., delivering the opinion of the Court, depicted freedom of speech and of the press as 
“fundamental personal rights and liberties.” Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939). 
 52.  UDHR, supra note 4, art. 5. The Eighth Amendment, by contrast, prohibits “cruel and 
unusual punishments.” 
 53.  UDHR, supra note 4, art. 7. The equal protection provision of the Fourteenth Amendment 
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States furthermore does not uphold the internationally proclaimed rights of the 
child,55 and declined to accept the obligation placed on States Parties to the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to outlaw “propaganda for war” and the 
“advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitute incitement or 
discrimination, hostility or violence.”56 
III. IMPLEMENTATION LEGISLATION 
In view of the ratification policy of the United States, the treatment of 
human rights violations is to a large extent dependent on implementation 
legislation through which the international human rights commitments of the 
United States are incorporated into the municipal legal system of the country. In 
this respect it might also be noted that the American implementation legislation 
is not always precisely in conformity with the prevailing international standards 
of human right protection. 
For example, in 1984, the United Nations adopted the Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment [hereinafter 
“Torture Convention”],57 placing an obligation on States Parties to take “effective 
legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture” 
within their respective territories58 and to incorporate the crime of torture as defined 
in the Convention into their national criminal justice systems.59 
The Torture Convention has several outstanding features: (a) Torture is 
condemned regardless of the circumstances;60 (b) the Convention follows the 
principle of compulsory universal application: that is to say, it is made applicable to 
all countries of the world (and not only to States Parties) so that even acts of torture 
committed in a non-Party country are punishable in a State Party to the 
 
applies only within each state and not within the United States of America as a single political entity. 
The United States has been condemned on several occasions by the Inter-American Commission of 
Human Rights for not complying with the international norm requiring equal justice for all within its 
national borders. See, eg., Roach & Pinkerton v. United States of America, Res. No. 3/87, Case No. 
9647 (United States), OEA/Ser.L/V/II.71. doc. 9 rev. 1 (1986-87), par. 65 (Sept. 22, 1987). 
 54.  UDHR, supra note 4, arts. 21–27. The United States declined to ratify the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which afforded binding force to those economic and social rights. 
 55.  As to the most regrettable state of the American system of juvenile justice, see Johan D. van 
der Vyver, International Standards for the Promotion and Protection of Children’s Rights, 15 BUFFALO HUM. 
RTS. L. REV., 81–108 (2009). 
 56.  ICCPR, supra note 37, art. 20; and see 138 CONG. REC. S4781-01 (daily ed., April 2, 1992), 
Reservation 1(1); see also id., Understanding III(2). 
 57.  Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(1984),G.A. Res. 39/46 of 10 Dec. 1984, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51), U.N. Doc. A/39/51, at 197, 
reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), as modified (24 I.L.M. 535 (1985)) [hereafter “Torture Convention]; 
and see generally J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST 
TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR 
DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT (1988) [hereinafter “Torture Convention”]. 
 58.  BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 57, at 178, (citing art. 2, cl. 1). 
 59.  Id. at 178, (citing art. 4) (ensuring that each State Party criminalizes acts of torture and 
attempted torture). 
 60.  Id. at 178 (citing art. 2 (2)) (refusing to accept even a state of war or national emergency as 
justification for any form of torture). 
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Convention;61 (c) States Parties are under an obligation not to extradite any person if 
there are substantial grounds to believe that the person would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture in the state requesting the extradition;62 (d) an order of a 
superior officer or public authority cannot be raised as a defense by a person 
charged with torture;63 (e) the Convention itself serves as an extradition treaty 
among States Parties for purposes of bringing a perpetrator of torture to justice;64 (f) 
evidence obtained through torture must be rendered inadmissible in the criminal 
justice systems of States Parties;65 (g) the Convention places upon States Parties the 
obligation to create a public awareness through education and information 
concerning the prohibition of torture.66 
“Torture” is defined in the Torture Convention as follows: 
For the purposes of this Convention, the term “torture” means any act by which 
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on 
a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information 
or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is 
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third 
person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or 
suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.  It 
does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to 
lawful sanctions.67 
By excluding from the Torture Convention’s definition of torture “pain or 
suffering arising only from or inherent in, or incidental to, lawful sanctions,”68 the 
severe pain or suffering which attends many legitimate punishments — such as 
imprisonment, corporal punishment, or capital punishment — is removed from the 
scope of the Convention.  The phrase was not intended to exclude or to excuse 
legally sanctioned punishments that have all the makings of torture per se. Use of 
the word “only” was designed to make that distinction.  Corporal punishment and 
capital punishment, for example, are indeed cruel and inhuman but would not be 
torture, unless the flogging is excessive and executed over a long period of time, or 
the execution of a convicted offender is deliberately drawn out so as to add 
excessive pain or suffering to his or her misery. 
The United States ratified the Torture Convention in 1990,69 and enacted the 
 
 61.  Id. at 178–79 (citing art. 5) (making torture an extraditable offense within any State Party). 
 62.  Id. at 178 (citing art. 3(1)) (establishing that a person who may potentially be tortured shall 
not be extradited). 
 63.  See id. at art. 2(3) (excluding the often used “I was acting under orders” defense). 
 64.  Id. at 180 (citing art. 8(2)) (creating a presumptive right of extradition between the States 
Parties to the Convention even if their individual treaties do not include an extradition clause). 
 65.  Id. at 181 (citing art. 15) (excluding from evidence statements of a person that were obtained 
through torture “except against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was 
made”). 
 66.  Id. at 180 (citing art. 10) (requiring educational and informational programs regarding the 
prohibition against torture for law enforcement, military, medical  personnel, or any public official 
who may come into contact with  detained persons). 
 67.  Id. at 177–78 (citing art. 1(1)). 
 68.  Id., at 177 (citing art. 1(1)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (3)(b)(1)(2006). 
 69.  136 CONG. REC. 36, 198 (1990). 
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Torture Convention Implementation Act with a view to bringing the U.S. criminal 
code in conformity with the Convention directives.70  Torture is defined in the Act 
as: “an act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically 
intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or 
suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or 
physical control.”71 
The American definition of torture differs in several respects from the one 
contained in the Torture Convention. This applies in the first place to the 
perpetrator of torture, which in the Torture Convention is confined to “a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity” and 
in the Torture Convention Implementation Act in more broader terms to “a person 
acting under the color of law.” This deviation from the wording of the Torture 
Convention is fully justified. One must bear in mind, namely, that the Torture 
Convention, being an international treaty, only addresses the obligations of States 
and therefore has a limited application to state action only.  The customary-law 
meaning of torture exceeds the confines of the Convention: Insofar as municipal 
criminal justice systems apply to the criminal conduct of individuals as well as state 
officials, the prohibition of torture should not be limited to acts of torture committed 
only by state actors.72 
Under the Torture Convention Implementation Act, torture is not a special 
intent crime; or to be more precise, a double special intent crime. Torture as defined 
in the Torture Convention requires intent to inflict serious physical or mental pain 
or suffering, plus the further intention to do so for such purposes as (a) obtaining 
from him or a third person information or a confession, (b) punishing him for an 
act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, (c) 
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or (d) for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind. The purposive element of torture is not included in the 
definition of torture in the Torture Convention Implementation Act. 
Torture as defined in the Torture Convention and in the Torture Convention 
Implementation Act applies in both instances to severe physical or mental pain or 
suffering. Drafters of the Torture Convention Implementation Act saw fit to define 
the mental (not the physical) manifestation of torture. “[S]evere mental pain or 
suffering” in American law includes: 
(B) The administration or application, or threatened administration or 
application, of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to 
disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; 
(C) The threat of imminent death; or 
 
 70.  Torture Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-236, 108 Stat. 463 (1994). 
 71.  18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2006). 
 72.  The European Court of Human Rights has decided that the duty of High Contracting States 
not to expel an alien to a country where he or she would run a serious risk of being subjected to 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment also applies if that risk emanates exclusively from private 
individuals or groups. See, e.g., H L R v. France, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 29, 36–41 (1997) (holding that a 
probability of torture or inhumane treatment at the hands of private individuals, as opposed to a 
government authority, in defendant’s home country also invokes Article 3 of the Convention). 
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(D) The threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe 
physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind-altering 
substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or 
personality.73 
A person who, under the color of law, intentionally threatens someone 
within his or her custody with severe pain or suffering also commits torture as 
defined in the Torture Convention Implementation Act. 
Based on this definition and assuming that it also applies to the infliction of 
severe physical pain, the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) used a 
variety of interrogation techniques on Guantánamo Bay detainees that were, to 
say the least, highly questionable. On April 16, 2009, four secret Memorandums 
used by the George W. Bush administration to justify the Guantánamo 
interrogation techniques were released by the Department of Justice upon the 
instructions of President Barack Obama. In the first memorandum, dated August 
1, 2002, Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee expressed the opinion that the 
concerned methods of interrogations, including sleep deprivation and the 
simulation of drowning through water boarding,74 did not amount to torture, 
because “[n]ot only must the course of conduct be a predicate act, but also those 
who use the procedure must actually cause prolonged [physical or] mental 
harm.” Bybee went on to say: “A defendant acts in good faith when he has an 
honest belief that his action will not result in severe pain and suffering . . . Good 
faith may be established by, among other things, the reliance on the advice of 
experts.” 
This reasoning was not persuasive to the Obama administration, or to the 
rest of the world. Within his first week in office, President Obama issued 
Executive Orders for the closure “as soon as possible” of detention facilities at 
Guantánomo Bay,75 and mandated that detainees in custody or under effective 
control must be detained “in conformity with all the conditions stipulated in 
Common Article 3” of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,76 The 
President issued instructions that only lawful methods of interrogation may be 
used,77 and nominated a task force “to conduct a comprehensive review of the 
lawful options available to the Federal Government with respect to the 
apprehension, detention, trial, transfer, release, or other disposition of 
individuals captures or apprehended in connection with armed conflicts and 
 
 73.  18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2)(B)–(D). 
 74.  Three detainees have been water boarded at Guantánamo: Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, 
believed to have masterminded the September 11th attack, and al Queda leaders Abu Zubaydah and 
Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri. These detainees were water boarded 266 times. Abu Zubaydah, believed to 
be a close associate of Osama bin Laden, was water boarded 83 times in August 2002. In the case of 
water boarding, the subject is strapped to a board placed at an incline with the subject’s head lower 
than his feet, a cloth is placed over his face, and water is repeatedly poured over the cloth, 
penetrating the nose and interrupting breathing, thereby triggering a gag reflex and choking the 
subject. 
 75.  Exec. Order No. 13492, ¶ 3, 74 Fed. Reg. 16, 4897   (22 Jan. 2009), available at 
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E9-1893.pdf. 
 76.  Id., at ¶ 6. 
 77.  Exec. Order No. 13491, 74 Fed. Reg.16, 4893 (22 Jan. 2009), available at 
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E9-1885.pdf. 
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counterterrorism operations.”78 
Although persons responsible for acts of torture as defined in the Torture 
Convention can be prosecuted in the United States, President Obama on April 17, 
2009, stated publicly that the persons responsible for administering unlawful 
methods of interrogation at Guantánamo Bay will not be prosecuted.  This is 
understandable, at least as far as the persons actually executing the acts of water 
boarding are concerned who were given assurances that water boarding was 
lawful.  As far as the public officials of higher rank are concerned, notably those 
“experts” who advised members of the CIA that their methods of interrogation 
were lawful, granting a pardon is perhaps less so ― though one should have 
understanding, as a matter of real politique, for the new President not wanting to 
sanction high-ranking officials of the previous regime.  It must be realized, 
though, that persons responsible for ordering, justifying, or executing acts of 
torture can be prosecuted in certain other countries under the rubric of universal 
jurisdiction. 
The Torture Convention Implementation Act makes provision, in conformity 
with the Torture Convention, for the exercise of universal jurisdiction by American 
courts to bring perpetrators of torture committed outside the United States to 
justice, irrespective of the nationality of the victim or of the alleged offender.79 The 
Act was subsequently amended to subject someone who conspires to commit 
torture to the same penalties as one who has actually committed torture, with the 
exception of the death penalty.80 
The above analysis shows that implementation legislation enacted by the 
United States to incorporate international human rights conventions is not always 
fully in accord with the Convention provisions. This in itself is not necessarily a bad 
thing. National States must adapt the international norms to the demands of their 
municipal legal systems, and in many cases improve the protections dictated by the 
international convention. Defining “severe mental pain or suffering” in the 
Torture Convention Implementation Act , and including in that definition “the 
administration or application . . . of mind-altering substances or other procedures 
calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality” represents a 
positive contribution of the United States to the refinement of the concept of 
“torture.” This is of particular significance for purposes of dealing with 
international human rights violations in the United States. 
IV. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 
Article I, Section (8), Clause [10] of the American Constitution afforded to 
Congress the power “To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on 
the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations.” 
The language chosen by the Founders was not exactly elegant or precise, 
 
 78.  Exec. Order No. 13493 ¶ 1(e), 74 Fed. Reg. 16, 4901 (22 Jan. 2009), available at 
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E9-1895.pdf. 
 79.  Torture Convention Implementation Act, supra note 70, § 2340A(a)–(b) (declaring that 
United States Courts will have jurisdiction over both a national of the United States and also people 
in the United States even if they are not a United States national). 
 80.  USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 811, 115 Stat. 272, 381 (2001). 
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but it has now been settled that the competence to bring perpetrators of the 
concerned crimes to justice was not the business of the federal legislature but 
vested in federal courts,81 and in the case of war crimes in military tribunals.82 
This was indeed confirmed by The Judiciary Act of 1789, under which the federal 
court system was established. Section 11 of the Act afforded to circuit courts 
“exclusive cognizance of all crimes and offences cognizable under the authority 
of the United States.”83 Clause [10] was the only provision in the Constitution 
that referred to criminal offences and it is reasonable to assume that drafters of 
Article 11 intended those offences to be prosecuted by federal courts.84 It has also 
been settled that the constitutional instruction for Congress to define piracies and 
felonies on the high seas and offences against the law of nations does not entail 
an obligation on the part of Congress to define such offences or to enact laws that 
would incorporate the offence in question into the criminal justice system of the 
United States. If “by consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on 
public law; or by the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial 
decisions recognizing and enforcing that law,” the crime to be punished is 
“defined in international law with reasonable certainty,” no further intervention 
by Congress is required.85 The “reasonable certainty” prong of this requirement 
is based on the principle of legality as required by the norms of criminal justice. 
The principle of legality has been defined by the U.S. Supreme Court in a totally 
different context as censuring a criminal statute that was “so vague that men of 
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its 
application.”86 
Article I, Section (8), Clause [10], thus in a word afforded to federal courts 
universal jurisdiction to prosecute piracies and felonies committed on the high 
seas and offenses against the law of nations — a phrase which is currently more 
commonly referred to a customary international law.87 
Universal jurisdiction has been defined accordingly as “the right of a state to 
institute legal proceedings and to try the presumed author of an offence, 
irrespective of the place where the said offence has been committed, the 
 
 81.  See, e.g., Edwin D. Dickenson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United 
States, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26, 46–47 (1952); Johan D. van der Vyver, Prosecuting Offences against the Law 
of Nations in the United States, 20 EMORY INT’L L. REV., 473, 480 (2006). 
 82.  See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1942) (proclaiming that the U.S. Supreme Court has 
“from the beginning of its history, . . . recognized and applied the law of war as including that part of 
the law of nations which prescribes, for the conduct of war, the status, rights and duties of enemy 
nations as well as enemy individuals”). 
 83.  The Judiciary Act, sec. 11, 1 STAT. 73 (1789); see Quincy Wright, Treaties and the Constitutional 
Separation of Powers in the United States, 12 AJIL 64, 84 n.89 (1918) (noting that the Section afforded 
concurrent jurisdiction to circuit courts with district courts “of the crimes and offences cognizable 
therein”); see also Jordan J. Paust, Congress and Genocide: They’re Not Going to Get Away With It, 11 
MICH. J. INT’L  L. 90, 103 (1989-90). 
 84.  Dickenson, supra note 81, at 46-47 (1952); see Zamora-Trevino v. Barton, 727 F. Supp. 589, at 
591 (D. Kan., 1989) (proclaiming that international law is a matter of federal law). 
 85.  United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, at 160–61 (1820). 
 86.  Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, at 391 (1926). 
 87.  See Johan D. van der Vyver, Prosecuting Offences against the Law of Nations in the United States, 
20 EMORY INT’L L. REV., 473, 482, 500 (2006). 
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nationality or the place of residence of its presumed author or of the victim.@88 
Universal jurisdiction to prosecute international crimes amounts to the 
implementation of international law pertaining to the most heinous crimes under 
customary international law that can be prosecuted in the municipal courts of 
any state irrespective of the locality of the crime or the nationality of the 
perpetrator. In his seminal anthology on war and peace, Grotius (1583-1645) 
proclaimed: 
The fact must also be recognized that kings, and those who possess rights equal 
to those kings, have the right of demanding punishments not only on account of 
injuries committed against themselves or their subjects, but also on account of 
injuries which do not directly affect them but excessively violate the law of 
nature or of nations in regard to any person whatsoever.89 
Several international conventions incorporated the principle of universal 
 
 88.  Symposium, Brussels Principles against Immunity and for International Justice, Principle 13, 
Brussels Group for International Justice,, 149, 157 (2002) (Combatting Impunity: Proceedings of the 
Symposium Held in Brussels from 11 to 13 March 2002); and see OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 
469-70  (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992); 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 31-33 
(M. Cherif Baassiouni ed., 1986); LYAL S. SUNGA, INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
FOR SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 102–16 (1992); LEILA NADYA SADAT, THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE FOR THE NEW 
MILLENNIUM 109–10 (2002); GERHARD WERLE, VÖLKERSTRAFRECHT 69 (2003); Sharon A. Williams, 
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 332–33 (Otto Triffterer 
ed., 1999); Michael P. Scharf, THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 215 
Sarah B. Sewall and Carl Kaysen eds., (2000); Christopher Keith Hall, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE FOR THE DOWNTRODDEN: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ASBJØRN EIDE, 112 (Morten Bergsmo ed., 
2003); T.B. Murray, The Present Position of International Criminal Justice, 36 GROTIUS TRANSACTIONS 191, 
194-95 (1950); Christopher L. Blakesley, United States Jurisdiction on Extraterritorial Crime, 73 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 1109, 1139-41 (1982); Jordan J. Paust, Federal Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Acts of 
Terrorism and Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators of International Law Under the FSIA and the Act of State 
Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT’L L. 191, 211–15 (1983); Jeffrey Alan McCredie, Contemporary Uses of Force against 
Terrorism: The United States Response to Achillo Lauro-Questions of Jurisdiction and its Exercise, 16 GA. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 435, 439 (1986); Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction under International Law, 66 
TEX. L. REV. 785, 788 (1986); M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Crimes against Humanity”: The Need for a Specialized 
Convention, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L  L. 457, 481–82 (1994); Hans Corell, Nuremberg and the 
Development of an International Criminal Court, 149 MIL. L. REV. 87, 90 (1995); Theodor Meron, 
International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT’L L.554, 576 (1995); Christopher C. 
Joyner, Arresting Impunity: The Case for Universal Jurisdiction in Bringing War Criminals to 
Accountability, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153, 165–66 (1996); Beth van Schaack, The Crime of Political 
Genocide: Repairing the Genocide Convention’s Blind Spot, 106 YALE L.J. 2259, 2278–80 (1997); Matthew 
Lippman, Crimes against Humanity, 17 B. C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 171, 238–49 (1997); Bryan F. 
MacPherson, Building an International Criminal Court for the Twenty-First Century, 13 CONN. J. INT’L L. 
1, 3–4 (1998); Jelena Pejic, Creating a Permanent International Criminal Court: The Obstacles to 
Independence and Effectiveness, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 321 (1998); J.D. van der Vyver, 
Universal Jurisdiction in International Criminal Law, 24 S. AFR. Y.B. INT’L L. 107 (1999); Lee A. Steven, 
Genocide and the Duty to Extradite or Prosecute: Why the United States is in Breach of Its International 
Obligations, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 425, 433–36 (1999); Henry T. King & Theodore C. Theofrastous, From 
Nuremberg to Rome: A Step Backward for U.S. Foreign Policy, 31 CASE W. J. INT’L L. 47, 53–57 (1999); 
Douglass Cassel, Empowering United States Courts to Hear Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 421, 427–28 (2000); Gerhard Erasmus & Gerhard 
Kemp, The Application of International Criminal Law Before Domestic Courts in the Light of Recent 
Developments in International and Constitutional Law, 27 S. AFR. Y.B. INT’L L. 64, 65–68 (2002). 
 89.  2 Hugo GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES 505 (1626). 
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jurisdiction for prosecution of crimes to which they relate by mandating States 
Parties to either extradite a suspect in their custody or to assert jurisdiction over 
the suspect, irrespective of where the crime was committed.90 Each one of the 
four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 relating to armed conflicts contains 
the following provision: 
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons 
alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, . . . grave 
breaches [of the Convention], and shall bring such persons, regardless of their 
nationality, before its own courts.  It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance 
with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to 
another High Contracting Party concerned, provided the High Contracting Party 
has made out a prima facie case.91 
The obligation placed upon States Parties to an international treaty by that 
treaty to exercise universal jurisdiction to bring perpetrators of crimes specified 
in the treaty to justice is commonly referred to as “compulsory universal 
jurisdiction”.92 
The United States has since early times recognized the power of its courts to 
prosecute persons for acts of piracy,93 and by participating in the Nuremberg and 
 
 90.  See, e.g., the Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 1970, 
art. 4(2), 22 U.S.T. 1641; 10 I.L.M.133 (1971) the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts against the Safety of Civilian Aviation, 1971, art. 5(2), 24 U.S.T. 565; 10 I.L.M. 1151 (1971); The 
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, 1973, art. 5, G.A. Res. 
3068 (XXVIII) of Nov. 30, 1973 (annex), 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30), U.N. Doc. A/9030, at 75; 1015 
U.N.T.S. 244; the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally 
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, 1973, art. 3(2), 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167 
(1977); the International Convention against Taking of Hostages, 1979, art. 5(2), G.A. Res. 146 (XXXIV) 
of 17 Dec. 1979, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46), U.N. Doc. A/34/46, at 245 (1979); 74 AM. J. INT’L. L.. 
227 (Jan. 1980); 18 I.L.M. 1456 (1979); the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1984, art. 5(2), G.A. Res. 39/46 of Dec. 10, 1984, 39 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. (No. 51), U.N. Doc. A/39/51, at 197; 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), as modified (24 I.L.M. 535 (1985)). 
 91.  Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces 
in the Field, 1949, art. 49, 6 U.S.T. 3115, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 1949, art. 50, 6 U.S.T 3219, 
75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 1949, art. 129, 6 U.S.T. 
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 
1949, art. 146, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; and see C.P.M. Cleiren & M.E.M. Tijssen, Rape and Sexual 
Assault in the Armed Conflict of the Former Yugoslavia: Legal, Procedural, and Evidentiary Issues, 5 CR. L. F. 
471, 486–87 (1994); Andreas Zimmermann, Die Schaffung eines ständigen Internationalen 
Strafgerichshofes: Perspectiven und Probleme vor der Sraatenkonferenz in Rom, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT 47, 90–91 (1998); 2, THE ROME STATUTE OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY, 1879–80 (Gennady M. Danilenko et al. eds., 
2002); Hall, supra n. 78, at 130-31. 
 92.  See, for example, Mireille Delmas-Marty, The ICC and the Interaction of International and 
National Legal Systems, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 1919 
(Antonoio Cassese, Paolo Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones eds., 2002). 
 93.  See, e.g., United States v. Smith , 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 162 (1820) (“. . . the general practice 
of all nations in punishing all persons, whether natives or foreigners, who have committed this 
offence [of piracy] against any person whatsoever, with whom they are in amity, is a conclusive proof 
that the offence is supposed to depend, not upon the particular provisions of any municipal code, but 
upon the law of nations, both for its definition and punishment); United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 
26 Fed. Cas. 832, 843 (CCD. Mass., 1822) (No. 15,551) (“. . . no one can doubt, that vessels and 
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Tokyo trials, it has also recognized the validity of universal jurisdiction with 
respect to at least war crimes and crimes against humanity.94 American courts 
often refer with approval to the principle of universality with regard to crimes 
other than piracy.95 The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law is quite explicit in 
this regard: 
A state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for certain offences 
recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, 
slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps 
certain acts of terrorism, even where none of the bases of jurisdiction . . . is 
present.96 
The principle of universal jurisdiction was directly in issue in the case of 
Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky.97 Israel sought the extradition from the United States of 
Demjanjuk to stand trial in that country for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity committed by him in 1943 as a guard at the Sobidór death camp of 
Nazi Germany in present-day Poland. Demjanjuk opposed the application inter 
alia on the grounds that Israel had no jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed 
outside its geographical boundaries and at a time when Israel did not even exist 
as a State. Having asserted that international law recognized universal 
jurisdiction over certain crimes,98 the court decided that the fact that Demjanjuk 
was to be charged with having committed the criminal acts in Poland did not 
deprive Israel of authority to bring him to trial. It might be noted that Demjanjuk 
was acquitted in Israel for lack of evidence identifying him as “Ivan the Terrible” 
who was responsible for the death of approximately 16 000 people.99 He returned 
to the United States and was deprived by American authorities of his permanent 
resident status. Following a long legal battle to remain in the United States, the 
U.S. Supreme Court on May 7, 2009 finally denied a stay of his deportation to 
Germany.100 John Demjanjuk ― a native Ukrainian, 89 years old and described by 
some as “a sick old man” ― arrived in Munich on May 12, 2009 to stand trial in 
Germany for the crimes he allegedly committed during World War II. His trial 
 
property in the possession of pirates may be lawfully seized on the high sea by any person, and 
brought in for adjudication”). 
 94.  Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 583 (6th Cir. 1985); see United States v. Yoosef, 327 F 
3d 56, 103 (2d Cir. 2003) (confirming that universal jurisdiction is permitted over piracy, war crimes 
and crimes against humanity). 
 95.  See, e.g., Rivand v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, at 885–86 (5th Cir. 1967) (conspiracy); 
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) (torture); United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 
212, at 216–23 (ND Cal. 1981) (terrorism); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, at 781 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984) (terrorism); Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 581–83 (crimes against humanity); United States v. 
Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, at 900–01 (D.D.C. 1988), 924 F.2d 1086, at 1092 (D.C.Cir. 1991) (aircraft piracy 
and hostage taking); PAUST, supra note 16, at 420–22. 
 96.  Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 404; see BeAnnal v. 
Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 371 (E.D. La. 1997). 
 97.  Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 583 (6th Cir. 1985). 
 98.  Id., at 582. 
 99.  Ivan (John) Demjanjuk v. State of Israel (Special Issue), Criminal Appeal 347/88 (1993); see 
Mordichai Kremnitzer, The Demjanjuk Case, 24 ISRAELI Y.B. HUM. RTS 269–95 (1994); Fania Domb, The 
Demjanjuk Trial, 24 ISRAELI Y.B. HUM. RTS 323–41 (1994)  
 100.  John D. Demjanjuk v. Eric H. Holder Jr., Attorney General, Appl. 08A978 (May 7, 2009). 
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before the Landsgericht (Provincial Court) of Munich commenced on August 30, 
2009, and on May 12, 2011 he was convicted on several serious charges and 
sentenced to five years in prison.101 He appealed against his conviction and 
sentence and died before the appeal could be heard. In German law, a conviction 
is suspended pending an appeal and Demjanjuk consequently went to his grave 
without a criminal record.102 
Federal courts have also asserted jurisdiction in cases of aircraft hijacking 
that occurred beyond the national borders of the United States.  The jurisdiction 
of a federal court in United States v. Rezaq relating to hijacking of a flight of 
Airegypt from Athens (Greece) to Cairo (Egypt) in which an Israeli and 
American citizen were killed by the hijackers103 could be based on the passive 
personality principle,104 but the Court also stated that “[t]he justification for 
universal jurisdiction over highjackers is clear.”105 Jurisdiction in the case of 
United States v. Yunis106 for air piracy derived solely from the principle of 
universal jurisdiction since American citizens were not victims of the hijacking.  
In the appeal case, the Court noted that “[a]ircraft highjacking may well be one of 
the few crimes so clearly condemned under the law of nations that states may 
assert universal jurisdiction to bring offenders to justice, even when the state has 
no territorial connection to the hijacking and its citizens are not involved.”107 
Courts in the United States would not readily assert extra-territorial 
jurisdiction in criminal cases, absent a clear congressional directive.108 In 
Prosecutor v. Yoosef, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit proclaimed 
that the universality principle applies only to “the few near-unique offences 
uniformly recognized by the ‘civilized nations’ as an offence against the ‘Law of 
Nations’,”109 and went on to say: 
The historical restriction of universal jurisdiction to piracy, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity demonstrates that universal jurisdiction arises under 
customary international law only where crimes (1) are universally condemned by 
the community of nations, and (2) by their nature occur either outside of a State 
or where there is no State capable of punishing, or competent to punish, the 
 
 101.  John Demjanjuk, Landsgericht München II, Strafkammer (Aktenzeichen 1 Ks 115 Js 
12496/08); and see Christian Fahl, Einige materielle und prozessuale Űberlegungen zum Fall Demjanjuk, 3 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS JURISTISCHE STUDIUM, 229–34 (2011), available at www.zjs-online.com. 
 102.  See in general, John Demjanjuk, WIKIPEDIA, available at http:// en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/John_Demjanjuk. 
 103.  United States v. Rezaq, 899 Fed. Supp. 697 (D.D.C 1995), aff’d United States v. Rezaq, 134 
F.3rd 1121 (D.C.C. 1998). 
 104.  The passive personality principle affords to the courts of a particular state the competence to 
exercise criminal jurisdiction over a crime committed outside of the borders of that state if a victim of 
the crime is a national of that state. 
 105.  United States v. Rezaq, 899 Fed. Supp. at 709. 
 106.  United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 900–01 (D.D.C. 1988), 924 F.2d 1086, 1092 (D.C.Cir. 
1991). 
 107.  Id., at 1092.   
 108.  Id., at 1091; see United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, at 98 (1922); Foley Bros. Inc. v. Filardo, 
336 U.S. 281, at 285 (1949). 
 109.  United States v. Yoosef, 327 F 3d 56, 103 (2d Cir. 2003).  
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crime (as in a time of war).110 
It should be noted, though, that in international law the crimes that can be 
prosecuted under the rubric of universal jurisdiction in modern time include a 
much wider spectrum. In Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, the Court defined the current 
norm that supports, and at the same time confines, its application: 
The “universality principle” is based on the assumption that some crimes are so 
universally condemned that the perpetrators are the enemies of all people. 
Therefore, any nation which has custody of the perpetrators may punish them 
according to its law applicable to such offences.111 
The criterion for application of the principle of universal jurisdiction must 
accordingly be sought in the heinous nature of the crime (of which its 
dimensions are an element) and not so much in the absence of territorial 
jurisdiction of national states with regard to the locality of the crime.112 It is today 
generally accepted that crimes against humanity are subject to universal 
jurisdiction.113 The International Law Commission certainly proceeded on the 
assumption that States Parties “shall take such measures as may be necessary to 
establish its jurisdiction over” an impressive list of crimes against humanity, 
“irrespective of where or by whom those crimes were committed.”114 
A matter that has received special attention in recent years was whether or 
not acts of terror violence committed beyond the borders of the United States and 
not involving American nationals as the perpetrators or victims of such atrocities 
can be prosecuted in the United States under the rubric of universal 
jurisdiction.115 In Prosecutor v. Yoosef, it was decided that “[t]he indefinite 
category of ‘terrorism’ is not subject to universal jurisdiction.”116 Earlier, the 
District Court for New York cited with approval a passage from the Restatement 
of Law proclaiming that “universal jurisdiction is increasingly accepted for 
certain acts of terrorism, such as . . . indiscriminate violent assaults on people at 
large.”117 
Limitations to the exercise of universal jurisdiction are in general based on 
considerations of reasonableness, including a link of the criminal activity to the 
territory of the United States, or a connection based on residence or economic 
activity.118 The fact that perpetrators of crimes subject to universal jurisdiction 
 
 110.  Id., at 105. 
 111.  Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985). 
 112.  Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium, 2002 I.C.J. 3, (separate opinion of Judges Higgins, 
Kooijmans & Buergenthal), ¶ 46 (Feb. 14). 
 113.  Cleiren & Tijssen, supra note 91Error! Bookmark not defined., 486–87; L.C. Green, “Grave 
Breaches” or Crimes against Humanity, 8 U.S.A.F.A CAD.  J. LEGAL STUD. 19, 27–28 (1997-98); 
Zimmermann, supra note 81, at 89–90. 
 114.  International Law Commission, Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 
art. 8, read with art. 18, 51 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 14, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996).  
 115.  United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C.Cir. 1991); see United States v. Bowman, 260 
U.S. 94, 98 (1922); Foley Bros. Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949). 
 116.  United States v. Yoosef, 327 F 3d 56, 103 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 117.  United States v. Osama Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189, at 222 (SDNY 2000). 
 118.  Restatement (Third), supra note 15, at § 403. 
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are regarded as hostis humani generis (the enemy of all mankind)119 should suffice 
to establish such a link to the territory. Consider, however, the (initial) approach 
of the United States to the crime of genocide. 
The United States in 1986 ratified the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide subject to a package of RUDs that included 
two reservations, five understandings, and one declaration.120 The Declaration 
made the entering into force of the ratification instrument dependent on the 
enactment of implementation legislation, which did occur in 1988 when the 
Genocide Convention Implementation Act (the Proxmire Act) became law.121 
The reservations required in the one instance specific consent to submitting 
a dispute involving the Convention to the International Court of Justice,122 and 
the other proclaimed the supremacy of the U.S. Constitution over the treaty 
obligations of the United States.123 The list of understandings entailed the 
following directives: “intent to destroy in whole or in part” required by art. II of 
the Convention must be taken to mean the specific intent to destroy in whole “or 
in substantial part”; “mental harm” referred to in art. II(b) of the Convention 
must be restricted to “permanent impairment of mental faculties through drugs, 
torture, or similar techniques”; the principle of double criminality must apply as 
a condition of extradition; acts committed in armed conflict without the 
requirement of specific intent must not be taken to constitute genocide; and 
participation of the United States in an international penal court as contemplated 
by Article VI of the Convention will be conditional upon ratification of the 
concerned treaty by the U.S. Senate.124 
It has been said that ratification of the Genocide Convention by the U.S. 
Senate was merely “a symbolic act”125 and that the Senate, by insisting on the so-
called Sovereignty Package reflected in the RUDs was determined to “reduce the 
convention to nothing more than a symbol of opposition to genocide”126 — or in 
the words of Jordan Paust, “to gut the treaty of any meaningful effect.”127 In the 
present context it is of special importance to note that the Genocide Convention 
Implementation Act excluded the competence of American courts to exercise 
universal jurisdiction for the prosecution of acts of genocide.128 It restricted 
 
 119.  See, for example, The CASE OF S.S. LOTUS (FRANCE v. TURKEY), 1927 P.C.I.J., Ser. A No. 10 
(Judgment No. 9), par. 249 (Sept. 7, 1927) (Moore, J., dissenting, observing that a pirate “is treated as 
an outlaw, as the enemy of all mankind—hostis humani generis—whom any nation may in the interest 
of all capture and punish”). 
 120.  See 132 CONG. REC. S1337 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1986) (statement of Sen. Mitchell). As to the 
package of RUD’s, see Jordan J. Paust, Congress and Genocide: They’re Not Going to Get Away With It, 11 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 90 (1989-90); Matthew Lippman, The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide: Fifty Years Later, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 415, 482–88 (1998). 
 121.  102 Stat. 3045 (1988), 18 U.S.C.A., § 1091–93. 
 122.  132 CONG. REC. (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1986), Reservation (1). 
 123.  Id., Reservation (2). 
 124.  CONG. REC. S1355-01 (daily ed., Feb. 19, 1986). 
 125.  LAWRENCE J. LE BLANC, THE UNITED STATES AND THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION, 144, 238 
(1991). 
 126.  Id., at 241. 
 127.  Paust, supra note 120, at 94. 
 128.  The Genocide Convention seemingly does not found its jurisdictional provisions on the 
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jurisdiction of federal courts of the United States to instances of genocide 
committed in the United States, and to acts of genocide committed by an 
American citizen abroad.129 Its ultimate effect is therefore seemingly to preclude 
the prosecution in the United States of foreign nationals who have committed 
acts of genocide in a foreign country, thereby rendering the United States a safe 
haven for foreign perpetrators of genocide.130 
In 2007, Congress enacted, and President George W. Bush signed into law, 
the Genocide Accountability Act of 2007, which amended the provision excluding 
the competence of American courts to exercise universal jurisdiction in cases of 
genocide.131 Section 2(5) of the Act extended the jurisdiction of American courts 
to also prosecute an alleged perpetrator of genocide who is brought into, or 
found in, the United States (irrespective of the nationality or place of residence of 
that person) “after the conduct required for the offence occurs, . . . even if that 
conduct occurred outside the United States.”132 American courts can now 
exercise universal jurisdiction to bring perpetrators of genocide to justice but, 
understandably, cannot try them in absentia.133 
Congress has in recent years also extended the competence of American 
courts to exercise universal jurisdiction to other international crimes, such as the 
use of child soldiers,134 and the trafficking in persons.135 
 
principle of universal jurisdiction — at least not as far as prosecutions in the municipal courts of a 
State Party is concerned. Yet, probably no one would today deny that genocide is a crime under 
customary international law with the force of ius cogens and therefore subject to universal jurisdiction 
for bringing perpetrators of genocide to justice. See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)) 
Provisional Measures, 1993 I.C.J. 325, par. 110 at 443 (Sept. 13, 1993) (Judge Lauterpacht holding that 
the definition of “genocide” in Article 1 of the Genocide Convention was intended “to permit parties, 
within the domestic legislation that they adopt, to assume universal jurisdiction over the crime of 
genocide — that is to say, even when the acts have been committed outside their respective territories 
by persons who are not their nationals”); Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia) Preliminary Objections, 1996 I.C.J. 595, par. 
31 at 616 (July 11, 1996) (the ICJ reiterating that “the obligation each State thus has to prevent and 
punish the crime of genocide is not territorially limited by the Convention”); and see also Case 
Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia 
& Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), 1997 I.C.J. 243, par. 35 (at 258) (Dec. 17, 1997). 
 129.  18 U.S.C.A., § 1091 (d). 
 130.  See Steven, supra note 88, at 462, 464–65. 
 131.  Pub. L. No. 110-151; 121 Stat. 1821; see Zachary Pall, The Genocide Convention Accountability 
Act and U.S. Law: The Evolution and Lessons of Universal Jurisdiction for Genocide, 3.1 INTERDISCIPLINARY 
J. HUM. RTS. 13–34 (2008-2009). 
 132.  18 U.S.C.A., § 1091, as amended by the Genocide Accountability Act of 2007, § 2(5).  
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Child Soldiers Accountability Act, Public Law 110-340, 122 STAT. 3735 (Oct. 3, 2008), 18 
U.S.C. § 2442 (affording to American courts jurisdiction if the alleged offender is present in the 
United States, irrespective of the nationality of the alleged offender”).  
 135.  Trafficking in Persons Accountability Act of 2008, 110th Cong. § 1703 (Oct. 2, 2008) (affording 
to American courts jurisdiction if “an alleged offender is present in the United States, irrespective of 
the nationality of the alleged offender,” but placing a limitation on the exercise of jurisdiction “if a 
foreign government, in accordance with jurisdiction recognized by the United States, has prosecuted 
or is prosecuting such person for the conduct constituting such offence”).  
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V. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS 
In the United States, the principle of universal jurisdiction has also been 
made applicable to civil actions.  Under Alien Tort Statute (ATS), included in the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, federal courts have been granted original jurisdiction in 
civil actions by an alien for a tort committed in violation of the “law of nations” 
(customary international law) or a treaty ratified by the United States.136 The 
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1992 explicitly affords an action for damages to 
victims of torture suffered at the hands of any person acting under actual or 
apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation.137 The right to claim 
damages is here not confined to aliens but is also afforded to American citizens 
who had been exposed to torture by officials of a foreign State.138 
In the United States the concept of “the law of nations” has been clouded in 
controversies, largely in consequence of efforts to restrict the implementation of 
the ATS. It has come to be accepted that the substance of “the law of nations” 
must be established in view of the “customs and usages of civilized nations,”139 
which in turn “may be ascertained by consulting the works of jurists, writing 
professedly on public law; or by the general usage and practice of nations; or by 
judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law.”140 To qualify as a publicist 
whose works may serve as an authoritative source of the customs and usages of 
“civilized nations,” the jurists and commentators must be ones “who by years of 
labor, research and experience, have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted 
with the subject of which they treat.”141 Offences against the law of nations that 
have been identified by American courts thus far include piracy,142 torture,143 
 
 136.  28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
 137.  Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-2561, 106 Stat. 73 (March 12, 1992), 28 U.S.C. § 
1350 note.  The Act also affords an action for damages based on extra-judicial killings. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 672, at 700 (1900); and see also id., at 694, at 700–01, 708 (referring 
to “general assent/consent of civilized nations”); The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 115 (1825) 
(referring to “long usage and general acquiescence”); id., at 121 (requiring “general consent”); 
Johnson v. Twenty-One Bales, 13 Fed. Cas. 855, at 861 (Cir. Ct., N.Y., 1814) (proclaiming that the laws 
of war require “the sanction of the civilized world to invest them with the force and authority of 
laws”); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 210, at 225 (1840) (speaking of “those great 
and fundamental doctrines of international law, which, by common consent of mankind, are the basis 
of intercourse of the civilized world”); Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, at 670 (1863) (founding it on 
“the common consent as well as the common sense of the world”); The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170, 
at 187 (1871) (resting it “upon the common consent of civilized communities”); Dooley v. United 
States, 182 U.S. 222, at 230–31 (1901) (citing Halleck for holding that the law of nations derives from 
“usages of the world”); Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder, 225 F. Supp. 292, at 296 n.19 (1963) 
(basing it on the “common consent of nations”). 
 140.  United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160–61 (1820); see also Republica v. De 
Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111, at 116 (1784) (referring to “the practice of different nations, and the 
authority of writers”); Fremont v. United States, 58 U.S. 542, at 557 (1854); Moultree v. Hunt, 23 N.Y. 
394, at 396 (1861); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, at 163 (1894) (referring to “judicial decisions, . . . the 
works of jurists and commentators, and . . . the acts and usages of civilized nations”); Dooley v. 
United States, 182 U.S. 222, at 230–31 (1901)  (citing Halleck); Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder, 225 
F. Supp. 292, at 295 (1963); Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194, at 1201 n. 13 (9th Cir., 1975); 
Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 141.  Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 672, at 700 (1900); Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880–81. 
 142.  Smith, 18 U.S. at 161; Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880; Kadić v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 
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violations of the laws of war,144 the slave trade,145 arbitrary detentions,146 acts 
designed to intimidate, coerce, harass, or bring into disrepute diplomatic and 
consular representatives,147 and counterfeiting notes of foreign countries.148 
Actions entertained by American courts under the Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789 
were, for example, based on torture,149 genocide, war crimes, torture and 
summary executions,150 forced labor,151 and grave human rights abuses.152 
It should be noted, though, that the U.S. Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, more recently adopted a conservative approach to the concept of “law 
of nations” for purposes of the ATS on the assumption that “Congress intended 
the ATS to furnish jurisdiction for a relatively modest set of actions alleging 
violations of the law of nations.”153 Those probably included “offences against 
ambassadors,” “violations of safe conduct,” and “prize captures and piracy,” 
these being the only ones that were “definite and actionable.”154 Though 
American courts are not precluded from recognizing (new) causes of action 
based on “the present-day law of nations,”155 they “should not recognize private 
claims under federal common law for violations of any international law norm 
with less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the 
historical paradigms familiar when [the ATS] was enacted.”156 Noting among 
other things that the ATS might implicate the foreign relations of the United 
States and raises separation of powers concerns between the judiciary on the one 
hand, and the legislative and executive branches “in managing foreign affairs” 
on the other, the Court concluded that federal courts “have no congressional 
mandate to seek out and define new and debatable violations of the law of 
nations.”157 Acting upon this directive, the District Court of New York dismissed 
 
1995). 
 143.  Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880; In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 976 
F.2d 493, at 499–500 (9th Cir., 1992). 
 144.  Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, at 27–28, 29-30 (1942); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, at 7 (1946); 
Kadić, 70 F.3d at 239 (referring to “certain war crimes”); Doe v. Unocal Corporation, 2004 WL. 
2402875, 6 (9th Cir., 2004). 
 145.  Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. 1026, at 1030 (C.C., Ga., 1859); United States v. Haun, 26 
F. Cas. 227 (C.C.S.D. Ala., 1860); Kadić, 70 F.3d at 239; Doe, 2004 WL. 2402875, 6. 
 146.  Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, at 1541 (N.D. Cal., 1987); Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 
505 F. Supp. 787, at 798 (D.C. D. Kan., 1980). 
 147.  Frend v. United States, 100 F.2d 691, at 692–93 (C.A. D.C., 1938); see Dickenson, supra note 
81, at 30. 
 148.  United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, at 484 (1887). 
 149.  Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980).; Siderman de Blank v. Republic of 
Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, at 717 (9th Cir., 1992) (proclaiming that “the right to be free from torture is 
fundamental and universal, a right deserving of the highest status under international law, a norm of 
jus cogens”). 
 150.  Kadić, 70 F.3d at 239. 
 151.  Doe, 2004 WL. 2402875, 6. 
 152.  Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir., 2000). 
 153.  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, at 2759 (2004). 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Id., at 2761. 
 156.  Id., at 2765. 
 157.  Id., at 2763. 
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an action brought against 35 bank institutions for having supported the 
apartheid regime of South Africa by doing business with the South African 
government of yesteryear.158 
The cautious approach of the U.S. Supreme Court to application of the ATS 
was more recently endorsed in the court’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co. & others,159 but from a different angle. It was decided that foreign 
nationals could not sue corporations based in the Netherlands, Great British, and 
Nigeria in a U.S. federal court under the ATS for aiding and abetting human 
rights violations committed in Nigeria. The five-judge majority based its decision 
on the presumption against the extraterritorial application of American law, 
proclaiming with reference to Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd, that 
“[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has 
none.”160 Give “the danger of unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct of 
foreign policy” which “is magnified in the context of the ATS,” the majority 
endorsed “the need” emphasized in Sosa, “for judicial caution in considering 
which claims could be brought under the ATS.”161 Where, as in this case, the 
plaintiff and the corporate defendants are not nationals of the United States, and 
the tortuous acts complained of lacked any connection with the United States, 
“the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS.”162 
“And even where the claims touch and concerns the territory of the United 
States,” the majority concluded, “they must do so with sufficient force to displace 
the presumption against extraterritorial application” of the ATS.163 
Justice Breyer, J. (with whom Justices Ginsberg, Sotomayor and Kagan 
agreed), based his concurring judgment on the jurisdictional reach of American 
federal courts rather than on the presumption against extraterritoriality. 
Jurisdiction to adjudicate ATS cases must be founded on (a) the principle of 
territoriality (the alleged tort occurs on American soil”); (2) the principle of active 
personality (the defendant is an American national); or (3) considerations of the 
national interests of the United States (“the defendant’s conduct substantially 
and adversely affects an important American national interest”).164 It is rather 
surprising that Breyer, J. did not also consider universal jurisdiction as a basis for 
ATS adjudication but confined his jurisdictional analysis to the key issue as to 
whether or not “distinct American interests are at issue,”165 The ATS is after all 
founded on the application of universal jurisdiction to civil actions for damages. 
International law require of nations “not to provide safe harbours for their own 
nationals who commit . . .  serious crimes abroad.”166 Justice Breyer emphasized 
 
 158.  In re: South African Apartheid Legislation, 346 F. Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y., 2004). 
 159.  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 185 L.Ed. 2d 671 (2013). 
 160.  Id., at 133 S.Ct. at 1664, citing Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S _, _ (2010) 
(slip op. at 6); see also Kiobel, 133 S.Ct., at 1666 (referring to “the presumption against application of 
[the ATS] to conduct in the territory of another sovereign”). 
 161.  Kiobel, 133 S.Ct., at 1664. 
 162.  Id., at 1669. 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Id., at 1671; see also id., at 1673; Restatement (Third), supra note 15, Section 403. 
 165.  Id., at 1674. 
 166.  Id., at 1675. 
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in conclusion that the plaintiffs were not American nationals, that the conduct 
took place in another country, and that the defendants were not engaged in the 
acts of torture, genocide, or any equivalent crimes as principal perpetrators but 
were accused of merely aiding and abetting in the commission of those crimes.167 
Although the shares of the defendant companies are traded on the New York 
Stock Exchange and those companies have an office in New York (owned by an 
affiliated company), “it would be farfetched” to hold that their “indirect and 
minimal presence” will suffice “to vindicate a distinct American interest” in the 
United States for purposes of triggering the jurisdiction of the municipal 
courts.168 
Returning, though, to the question of universal jurisdiction which was not 
at issue in Kiobel, it must be emphasized that the U.S. Supreme Court in Sosa did 
not do justice to the fact that the law of nations is subject to “organic growth”169 
and is as such a progressive system of law: “Its principles are expanded and 
liberalized by the spirit of the age and country in which we live.”170 It was 
accordingly decided that courts of law must interpret international law not as it 
was in 1789, but as it evolved and exists among the nations of the world 
today.”171 In this regard a final word should therefore be devoted to the Statute 
of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute). 
It would be fair to conclude that the crimes listed in the ICC Statute reflect 
contemporary proscriptions of the law of nations. It is important to bear in mind 
that drafters of the ICC Statute decided to confine the subject-matter jurisdiction 
of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to customary-law crimes only,172 that 
those crimes were meticulously defined in the ICC Statute,173 and that the 
definitions of crimes in the ICC Statute, with only one exception,174 were adopted 
by general agreement and can therefore without question be accepted as 
reflective of the opinion juris ex necessitate. Insofar as some delegations who voted 
against adoption of the ICC Statute or abstained in the final vote based their 
concerns on the subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICC, their concerns were not 
 
 167.  Id., at 1678. 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Romero v. International Term, Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 360 (1959); Lopes v. Reederei 
Richard Schroder, 225 F. Supp. 292, 295–96 (1963). 
 170.  Bergman v. De Sieyes, 71 F. Supp. 334, at 337 (S.D.N.Y., 1946). 
 171.  Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980). Note that in Filartiga, “law of nations” 
was equated to “international law”. Id. 
 172.  See Herman von Hebel & Darryl Robinson, Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the Court, in ROY 
S. LEE (ed.), THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE: ISSUES, 
NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 79, at 80–81 (1999). 
 173.  Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7 (crimes against humanity), U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.183/9 (17 July 1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 1002 (1998) [hereafter “ICC Statute”]; and see also 
id., art. 6 (genocide), art. 8 (war crimes). 
 174.  Israel voted against adoption of the ICC Statute because of the inclusion of Article 
8(2)(b)(viii) (The transfer, directly or indirectly, by an Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian 
population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population 
of the occupied territory within or outside the territory”). The Israeli argument that this crime was 
not one under customary international law was supported by (probably) only the United States, but 
the U.S. delegation did not base its negative vote on the inclusion of that war crime in the ICC 
Statute. 
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founded on what went into the ICC Statute, but on what was not included,175 for 
example the crime of aggression176 (Sudan, speaking on behalf of the Arab Group 
of States),177 terrorism (Sri Lanka, Turkey), international drug trafficking 
(Trinidad and Tobago), and the threat or use of chemical and biological weapons 
(Singapore) and of nuclear weapons (Mexico and Sudan). Inclusion in the ICC 
Statute of war crimes committed in armed conflicts not of an international 
character was also mentioned by Turkey as a reason for its abstention. 
For the most part, therefore, the crimes as defined in the ICC Statute must 
be accepted as a clear codification of offences against the law of nations.  Nor 
ought the American opposition to the ICC regime prevent federal courts from 
accepting those crimes and their definitions as reflective of customary 
international law. The United States negative vote at the Rome Conference was 
not based on the subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICC, 178 and the American 
delegation in fact formed part of the body of States that adopted the definitions 
of crimes by general agreement. 
VI. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
International relations of the United States have over the years been tainted 
by a certain exclusive mind-set.  First and foremost in this regard is the notion 
that the United States is something special and should be treated differently 
within the international arena.  In conformity with this conviction, the United 
States has in the past maintained a degree of isolationism from institutions, 
norms and obligations that have come to be perceived as conducive to the 
promotion of international comity.  Refusal of the United States to become a 
member of the League of Nations over what some American analysts described 
as a mere triviality is often quoted as a prime example of American isolationism 
of yesteryear. 
Since the demise of communism, insistence of the United States on a right to 
be afforded special privileges in international law took on the form of American 
exceptionalism rather than isolationism. There is of course a certain link between 
isolationism and exceptionalism, but the two concepts attract different emphases.  
Isolationism signifies non-participation in affairs of the international community 
 
 175.  Statements made at the final session of the Assembly of the Whole in Rome explaining the 
vote or abstention of some delegates were recorded in United Nations Press Release of 17 July 1997, 
U.N. Doc. L/ROM/22 (1997); see also U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/ST.9. 
 176.  Aggression has been conditionally included in the subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICC, 
subject to agreement being reached on the crime of aggression and the conditions under which it can 
be prosecuted in the ICC. See ICC Statute, supra note 173, art. 5. General agreement was reached in 
this regard by the Review Conference that was held in Kampala, Uganda from May 31 to June 11, 
2010, but implementation of the Kampala decisions on the crime of aggression will be kept in 
abeyance and reconsidered after 1 January 2016. See Johan D. van der Vyver, Prosecuting the Crime of 
Aggression in the International Criminal Court, 1 UNIV. MIAMI NAT’L SECURITY & ARMED  CONFLICT L. 
REV. 1–52 (2011), available at http://www.nsac.law.miami.edu/?pageid=51. 
 177.  Note, though, that Egypt and Jordan did accept the ICC Statute “as a package”. 
 178.  American opposition to the ICC Statute in essence derived from insistence by the United 
States on “American exceptionalism” and the fact that the Rome Conference refused to render 
American nationals immune from prosecution in the ICC, and not on the substantive jurisdictional 
provisions of the ICC Statute. See VAN DER VYVER, supra note 46, at 159–220. 
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of States, while exceptionalism implies participation in international institutions 
and norm-creating activities but on basis of a privileged status for the State 
singled out for preferential treatment. 
American exceptionalism was the major policy position of the delegation of 
the United States in proceedings that culminated in the creation of the ICC by the 
Conference of Diplomatic Plenipotentiaries for the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court that was held in Rome on June 15, to July 17, 
1998.179 The American delegation had strict instructions from Washington D.C. to 
ensure that American nationals will not be subjected to prosecutions in an 
international criminal court without the consent of the American government.180 
Prior to the Rome Conference, Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), at the time Chair of 
the Senate Special Committee on Foreign Relations, in a letter addresses to 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright (dated March 26, 1998) promised that any 
treaty establishing “a permanent U.N. criminal court . . . without a clear U.S. 
veto . . . will be dead-on-arrival at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.”181 
For present purposes it will suffice to note that American exceptionalism was 
decisively rejected by the Rome Conference in what some analysts earmarked as 
probably the biggest diplomatic defeat the United States has ever suffered. 
Although the Clinton administration signed (not ratified) the ICC Statute, the 
Bush administration responded to this defeat by cancelling the signature of the 
United States and withdrawing from further participation of the United States in 
proceedings of organs of the ICC.182 
However, the election of Barack Obama to become the 44th President of the 
United States brought about radical changes in official governmental policies as 
far as international cooperation in matters of common interests is concerned. 
When the Human Rights Council of the United Nations was established in 2006, 
the George W. Bush administration indicated that it will not seek membership of 
the Council. In a letter dated April 24, 2009, the United States announced its 
candidacy for a seat in the Human Rights Council.183 Annexed to the letter was a 
 
 179.  The ICC Statute was adopted by the Rome Conference on 17 July 1998 and entered into force 
on 1 June 2002 following its ratification by 60 States. To date, 121 States have ratified the Statute. 
 180.  In an interview with The Washington Post preceding the Rome Conference, David Scheffer, 
Ambassador-at-Large for War Crime Issues and leader of the American delegation in proceedings for 
the establishment of an international criminal court, stated quite bluntly that “[a]ny arrangement by 
which a UN-sponsored tribunal could assert jurisdiction to prosecute Americans would be political 
poison in Congress.” See Thomas W. Lippman, Ambassador to the Darkest Areas of Human Conflict, THE 
WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 18, 1997) A19. 
 181.  On file with author; see also David Scheffer, US Policy on International Criminal Tribunals, 13 
AM. UNIV. INT’L L. REV. 1389, at 1399 (1998); David Scheffer, The United States and the International 
Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 12, at 18–19 (1999). 
 182.  As to the responses of the United States to the outcome of the Rome Conference, see JOHAN 
D. VAN DER VYVER, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: AMERICAN RESPONSES TO THE ROME 
CONFERENCE AND THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Institut für Rechtspolitik an der Universität 
Trier (2003); Johan D. van der Vyver, American Exceptionalism: Human Rights, International Criminal 
justice, and National Self-Righteousness, 50 EMORY L.J. 775–832 (2001). 
 183.  Letter dated April 22, 2009 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of 
America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. 
A/63/831 (24 April 2009), available at http:// www.un.org/ ga/ search/ view_ doc.asp ?symbol= A/ 
63/831&lang=E. 
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document outlining the commitments and pledges of the United States in respect 
of human rights.184 On May 12, 2009, the United States was duly elected to the 
Council (receiving 167 votes). 
The Obama administration has also given early indications of a revised 
policy toward the ICC. On January 29, 2009, in her first address to (a closed 
meeting of) the Security Council, newly appointed U.S. Ambassador to the 
United Nations Susan E. Rice observed: “The International Criminal Court, 
which has started its first trial this week, looks to become an important and 
credible instrument for trying to hold accountable the senior leadership 
responsible for atrocities committed in the Congo, Uganda, and Darfur.”185 In 
2009, the United States under guidance of the Obama administration “re-
engaged” with the ICC and has since then fully participated in proceedings of 
the ICC’s Assembly of States Parties. It not only fully participated in the Review 
Conference that was held in Kampala, Uganda on May 31 to June 11, 2010, but 
also became the first non-Party State to make pledges for future cooperation with 
the ICC. Those (two) pledges entailed, firstly, a renewed commitment “to 
support rule-of-law and capacity building projects which will enhance States’ 
ability to hold accountable those responsible for war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and genocide”; and secondly, a reaffirmation of “President Obama’s 
recognition on May 25, 2010 that we must renew our commitments and 
strengthen our capabilities to protect and assist civilians caught in the LRA’s 
wake, to receive those that surrender, and to support efforts to bring the LRA 
leadership to justice.”186 More recently, Congress adopted the Department of 
State Reward Program Update and Technical Corrections Act of 2012, which 
authorized the payment of “a reward to combat transnational organized crime 
and for information concerning foreign nationals wanted by international 
criminal tribunals.”187 The assessment of some analysts that the Bush 
administration’s negative attitude toward the ICC regime only deferred the 
question of American re-engagement with the ICC for another day,188 and 
predicting “the likelihood of an eventual warming of U.S. relations with the 
ICC,”189 have therefore come to pass. 
Needless to say, re-engagement of the United States with the ICC was an 
essential step toward securing American interests within the international 
criminal justice system and enhanced the treatment of international human rights 
violations in the United States. Although the United States, in deference to the 
principle of sovereign immunity, has taken a conservative stand on applying the 
 
 184.  U.S. Human Rights Commitments and Pledges, available at http:// www. state. gov. 
documents/ organization/122476.pdf (24 April 2009).  
 185.  Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Rep. to the United Nations, Statement Ambassador Susan E. 
Rice US Permanent Representative Respect International Humanitarian Law Security Council (Jan. 29, 2009), 
available at http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/2009/january/127018.htm. 
 186.  Id., (“LRA” denoting the Lord’s Resistance Army responsible for violence in northern 
Uganda). 
 187.  Department of State Reward Program Update and Technical Corrections Act of 2012, 112th 
Congress, 2nd Session, S, 2318 (April 19, 2012). 
 188.  BRUCE BROOMHALL, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: 
BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RULE OF LAW, 182 (2003). 
 189.  Id. 
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constitutional and statutory directives for the exercise of universal jurisdiction in 
criminal prosecution and civil actions, it remains a driving force within the 
international community for the promotion and protection of human rights 
violations occurring within and beyond its national borders. 
 
